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THE RULES AGAINST RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION,
AND AGAINST SUSPENSION OF THE ABSOLUTE
POWER OF ALIENATION IN MINNESOTA.

By EVERETT FRASER*

T

HE common law from a very early period has been opposed
to restraints on alienation, or to unreasonable suspension of
the power of alienation'. It has been the policy of the law to
keep property alienable, and liable for debts, and the policy has
been generally carried out, even in the face of a legislative enactment to the contrary 2. The courts seldom discuss the social basis
for the policy. They assume the utility of the rules they apply.
Attempts to make property inalienable take two geheral forms.
The alienor may attempt to impose express restraints upon the
alienation of the property which he transfers. Ownership of or
an estate in property may be given with an express provision
that the property shall not be aliened or taken for the debts of
the alienee. This provision may be a condition against alienation,
leaving, if valid, a right of re-entry in the alienor or his heirs for
breach of the condition. Or it may be a conditional limitation
of the property over to another upon breach. In either case there
is-forfeiture. Again it may be a mere declaration that the property
shall not be aliened or liable for the debts of the alienee without
providing for a forfeiture on the attempt to alien. The rules
*Dean of the Law School, University of Minnesota.
'For the general history see 1 Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law
310 et seq.; Gray, Restraints on Alienation. 2nd Ed. secs. 4-7, 13 et seq.;
Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities, 3rd Ed. sec. 109 et seq.; for a brief summary see 7 MINNEoTA LAW REvIEwV 564-569.
2The Statute De Donis (1285) created the estate-tail and declared
that the tenant in tail could not alien the estate. The courts two centuries
later allowed the tenant to alien by a common recovery. Taltarum's Case,
(1472) Y.B. 12 Edw. IV 19.
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against these attempts are known as the rules against restraints
on alienation.
Suspension of the absolute power of alienation exists when the
property is so limited that it is incapable of alienation for lack
of persons to alien the interests created. When the law allowed
interests to be limited to persons unborn or unascertained it became possible to postpone absolute ownership of the property and
consequently to suspend the absolute power of alienation of it. 3
To prevent carrying this scheme to extremes the common law developed the rule against perpetuities and the Minnesota statutes
have the rules against suspension of the absolute power of alienation.
Under the Minnesota statutes there is another way by which
suspension of the absolute power of alienation may arise. The
statutes authorize the creation of trusts 4 and provide that the inter-

ests arising under certain of these trusts shall be inalienable.5 The
owners may be ascertained persons, but their interests are made
inalienable 'by the law. The statutes then provide that trusts under
which the property in trust might be inalienable beyond a certain
period and trusts to continue beyond a certain period shall be
void. 6 These statutory provisions are included in the rules against
suspension of the absolute power of alienation.
The statutes of Minnesota have greatly changed the common
7
law relating to suspension of the absolute power of alienation.
The statutory rules in some respects allow greater freedom and
in other respects restrict much more narrowly suspension of the
absolute power of alienation of real estate. They allow the greatest latitude to trusts of personal property.' In the diversity, complexity, arbitrariness, and uncertainty of these rules Minnesota
can hardly be equalled, and cannot be outdone.
The main purpose of this article is to call attention to the need
of a revision of the rules against suspension of the absolute power
of alienation. But as there is confusion of the rules against
3

8-10.4

Gray, Perpetuities, 3rd Ed., secs. 2, 2a; Gray, Restraints, 2nd Ed., secs.
Minn., G.S. 1913 sec. 6710.

5Minn., G.S. 1913 secs. 6718, 6720. "No person beneficially interested in

a trust for the receipt of rents and profits of land can assign, or in any
manner dispose of, such interest . . ." "When the trust is expressed in
the instrument creating the estate, every sale, conveyance, or other act of
the trustees in contravention of the trust shall be absolutely void."
6Minn., G. S. 1913 sec. 6710, (3) (4) (6).
7Buck v. Walker, (1911) 115 Minn. 239, 132 N.W. 205; Mineral Land
Investment Co. v. Bishop Iron Co., (1916) 134 Minn. 412, 159 N. W. 966.
8y. M. C. A. v. Horn, (1913) 120 Minn. 404, 139 N. W. 805.
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restraints of alienation with the rules against suspension of the
absolute power of alienation,9 it is thought well first to state
briefly the rules against restraints that their relationship to the
rules against suspension may be clearly understood.
The Minnesota rules against restraints are not statutory. They
are in general the same rules that exist in other common law
jurisdictions, and use will be made of decisions in other jurisdictions on questions undecided in this state.
I.
THE RULES AGAINST DIRECT RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION

Of Estates in Fee Simple.-In general restraints on the
(a)
alienation of a fee simple estate in realty or an absolute interest
in personalty, legal or equitable, in possession or in remainder, are
void.' 0 Whether the restraint be in the form of a condition creating a right of reEntry in the alienor, or a conditional limitation
over to another, or a mere declaration that the alienee shall have
no power to alien makes no difference. There is a little authority
that a restraint against alienation to a restricted class is valid, but
authority in the United States has been against its validity. Even
if the restraint is limited in respect to time, e.g., the life of the
alienee or ten years, it is void by the Weight of authority when
attached to a fee simple or to an absolute interest in personalty.
In Hause v. O'Leary" there was a devise to devisor's husband
for life, then to their son in fee "provided that he shall not sell the
said described premises for five years after his father's death."
This gave the son a vested remainder in fee with a condition
against alienation. The district court considered the effect of
the statutes which provide that:
"Every future estate is void in its creation, which suspends
the absolute power of alienation for a longer period than is prescribed in this chapter; such power of alienation is suspended
when there are no persons in being by whom an absolute fee in
possession can be conveyed. The absolute power of alienation
shall not be suspended, by any limitation or condition whatever,
DSee Hause v. O'Leary, (1917) 136 Minn. 126, 161 N.W. 392. Gray,
Perpetuities, 3rd Ed. secs. 8-10. 2a, 3, 118a, 187, 236, 278- 2 78a, 437a-438,
736, 737, 743, 744, 747-752, 898-909.
589-591,
10 Gray, Restraints, 2nd Ed. secs. 13-30, 105-131k. A contingent remainder being inalienable at common law, a provision for forfeiture, if
alienation were attempted, was valid. Large's Case, (1588) 2 Leon. 82.
Likewise a vested remainder for a reason peculiar to English law. See
Kales, Estates and Future Interests, 2nd Ed. sec. 713; In re Porter, [1892]
3 Ch. 481, and see note 62.
"1(1917) 136 Minn. 126, 161 N.W. 392.
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for a longer period than during the continuance of two lives in
being at the creation of the estate ... "

The district court decided that the condition was intended to
restrain the son only, and so would come to an end on his death
even if he died within the five years. The power of alienation
was on this construction suspended for only one life in being at
the creation of the estate. Thus the proviso satisfied the statute
and the statute was held exclusive. The district court held the
proviso valid.
The supreme court agreed with this construction of the condition but held it void on common law principles as repugnant to
the estate devised. The court quoted with approval from the
leading case of Mandlebauin v. McDonell :12
"We are entirely satisfied that there has never been a time
since the statute Quia Emptores when a restriction in a conveyance of a vested estate in fee simple, in possession or remainder,
against selling for a particular period of time was valid by the
common law. And we think it would be unwise and injurious
to admit into the law the principle contended for by the defendant's counsel, that such restrictions should be held valid, if imposed
only "for a reasonable time. .

.

. The only safe rule of decision

is to hold, as I understand the common law for ages to have been,
that a condition or restriction which would suspend all power of
alienation for a single day, is inconsistent with the estate granted,
unreasonable and void."
A conditional limitation's over to another on alienation by a
prior taker is equally void. 14 Potter v. Couch15 is a typical case.
Real and personal property was devised for a term of twenty
years, with a vested remainder in fee to four persons. The devisor directed that none of the property should go to creditors or
assigns of the devisees, and that the share of any devisee who
should in any manner cease to be entitled should go over to others.
One of the devisees of the remainder assigned his share. The
devisee over brought suit for the property but the devise over
was held void. The Court said:
"The right of alienation is an inherent and inseparable quality
of an estate in fee simple. In a devise of land in fee simple, therefore, a condition against all alienation is void, because repugnant to
the estate devised. For the same reason, a limitation over, in case
the first devisee shall alien, is equally void, whether the estate
12(1874) 29 Mich. 78.
"3For the difference between a condition and a conditional limitation
see Gray,
Restraints, 2nd Ed., sec. 22 note.
14 Gray, Restraints, 2nd Ed. secs. 12, 29a, 79, 80.
15(1891) 141 U.S. 296, 35 L.Ed. 721, 11 S.C.R. 1005.
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be legal or equitable. And on principle, and according to the
weight of authority, a restriction, whether by way of condition or
of devise over, not forbidding alienation to particular persons or
for particular purposes only, but against any and all alienation
whatever during a limited time, of an estate in fee, is likewise
void, as repugnant to the estate devised to the first taker, by depriving him during that time of the inherent power of alienation."' 8

A mere restraint without provision for forfeiture is also void. 17
In Anderson v. Caryl' there was a devise of land to devisor's two
sons, T. and C.,
"Upon the following conditions: I direct that they shall not
be allowed to sell and dispose of said farm until the expiration of
ten years from the time my son C. (then fourteen) arrives at full
age, except to one another, nor shall either of my said sons have
authority to mortgage or encumber said farm in any manner
whatsoever."
T. mortgaged his undivided interest within the time. It was
held that this mortgage was valid. The court said:
"By these conditions (so nominated) we do not understand
that the testator intended a forfeiture upon breach; there is no
limitation over in favor of any one. .

.

. By the policy of our

law, it is of the very essence of an estate in fee simple absolute,
that the owner, who is not under any personal disability imposed
by law, may alien it or subject it to the payment of his debts, at
any and all times; and any attempt to evade or eliminate this element from a fee simple estate, either by deed or by will, must be
declared void and of no force."
By the common law the restraint on the fee simple is no more
effective when the property is put in trust, and the restraint is
imposed on the equitable fee simple of the beneficiary.' 9 Mebane
v. Mebane20 is a leading case. There was a devise of real and
personal property on trust for devisor's son with power to the
trustee at any time to take possession of the property and to
apply the income to the maintenance of the son. The testator's
declared purpose was that the property should not be subject to
the son's debts. A judgment debtor of the son filed a bill for
satisfaction out of the trust property and got judgment. The
court said that:
16Potter v. Couch, (1891) 141 U. S. 296, 315, 35 L. Ed. 712, 11
S.C.R. 1005.
'7Gray, Restraints, 2nd Ed. secs. 104-278a.
18(1881) 36 Ohio St. 506, 38 Am. Rep. 602.
19 Gray, Restraints, 2nd Ed. sec. 105 et seq. This statement is not
now true in Illinois and Massachusetts. See post note 62.
20(1845) 4 Ired. Eq. (N.C.) 131.
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"In a court of equity, a cestui que trust is looked on as the
real owner, and the trust is governed in this respect by the same
rules which govern legal interests, and, consequently, it is equally
repugnant to equitable ownership that the owner should not
have the power of alienating his property."
There were but two exceptions recognized by the common law.
A restraint of alienation annexed to a fee simple given to a
married woman for her separate use was effectual during her
coverture. 21 And property could be made inalienable by creating
a charitable trust. 22

Even in those jurisdictions where a spend-

thrift trust for a person sui juris is valid the restraints have generally been held valid only in respect to life estates, and not in
2
respect to the fee simple or ownership of personalty. 3
There is some authority that a restraint forbidding alienation
of a fee simple to a certain person, or to a particular class is
valid.24 The English courts have in a few cases upheld conditions
which restrain alienation very narrowly. 2 But the better considered cases hold the restraints void unless they leave the power
of alienation very broad.2 6 The decisions in America are in
conflict on the validity of restraints qualified as to persons.2 7
In Title Guarantee and Trust Co. v. Garrott,28 the-plaintiff had
in 1910 conveyed the land to K., on condition that if K. or her
heirs conveyed the land to a person of African, Chinese, or
Japanese descent prior to January 1, 1925, the title should revert
to the grantor. The plaintiff sought to enforce forfeiture for
21

Baggett v. Meux, (1844) 1 Coll. 138.

22"Gifts for these purposes have always formed an exception to the

general rule that the law does not allow property to be made permanently
inalienable." Sweet, Restraints on Alienation, 33 Law Quart. Rev. 237;
Gray,2 Perpetuities, 3rd Ed. sec. 590.
Gray, Restraints, 2nd Ed. sec. 114 et seq.; Hays v. Viehmeier, (1919)
265 Pa. 268, 108 Atl. 526; but see note 62.
24Littleton, Tenures, sec. 361; Shepard's Touchstone 129; Gray, Restraints, 2nd Ed. sec. 31 et seq.
2
5Doe v. Pearson (1805) 6 East 173 ("no power to dispose of her
share except to her sister or sisters, or to their children") ; in re Macleay,
(1875) L.R. 20 Eq. 186 ("on condition that he never sells it out of the
family"). A valuable article by Mr. Charles Sweet, 33 Law Quart. Rev.
236, 342, shows that these cases were wrongly decided because of a misunderstanding by the court of two earlier cases. See pages 246-252, 342348. This is the first satisfactory explaination of these cases which have
caused much of the uncertainty on this question.
26
Attwater v. Attwater, (1853) 18 Bea. 36, 18 Jur. 50, 2 W.R. 81;
In re Rosher, (1884) L.R. 26 Ch. Div. 801; Sweet, op. cit. 242, 342.
27
Jenne v. Jenn6, (1916) 271 Ill. 526, 111 N.E. 540 (gift over if
devisees give any part to S or his wife,--invalid).
28(1919) 42 Cal. App. 152, 183 Pac. 470. See 4 MINNEOTA LAW
REVIEW 68.

RULES AGAINST RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION

a breach but the court held the condition void. 29

191

There is, how-

ever, authority to the contrary in other jurisdictions3 o
The validity of restraints prohibiting alienation to a particular person or class is an open one in Minnesota. Morse v. Blood,"'
decided 'that a restraint in a will against alienation to relatives
of either the devisor or devisee, was void. The court seems to
lean towards the view that the test is the reasonableness of the
restraint. But the facts of the case were peculiar and it throws
little light upon the question.
Restraints on alienation of the fee simple qualified as to time
are void by the great weight of American authority.32 In Title
Guarantee and Trust Co. v. Garrott33 the condition restrained
alienation for only fifteen years; in Mebane v. Mebane 4 the
restraint was for a life in being; in Anderson v. Cary35 the re-

traint was for seventeen years; in Potter v. Couch3" the gift over
was to take effect only if the devisee ceased to be entitled before
he came into possession; and in the Minnesota case of Hause v.
O'Leary37 the restraint was limited to five years or to the life
of the devisee if he died within this time. And the restraint was
held void in all of them.
29But a condition that only persons of the Caucasian race be permitted
to "occupy" the land was enforced. Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Gary, (1920)
181 Cal.
680, 186 Pac. 596.
30Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, (1915) 136 La. 724, 67 So.
641 (not to be sold or leased to a negro for twenty-five years,-valid);
Koehler v. Rowland, (1918) 275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217 (not to be sold or
leased to a negro for twenty-five years,-valid) ; Overton v. Lea, (1902)
108 Tenn. 505, 68 S.W. 250, (gift over if devisee permit any of estate
to come into the possession of B. Kelly or her husband, or descendants,
or any one bearing the name of Kelly,-valid).
31(1897)
68 Minn. 442, 71 N.W. 682.
32
Especially if they are qualified only as to time. Gray, Restraints,
2nd Ed. secs. 45-54; Sweet, Article Restraints on Alienation, 33 Law
Quart. Rev. 348; 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 669 note; 24 Ann. Cas. 1329 note;
Ann. Cas. 1916D 1254 note; 11 Col. L. Rev. 365; 56 Can. L. Jour. 370;
De Peyster v. Michael, (1852) 6 N. Y. 467; Davidson v. Anwerda, (1922)
192 Ia. 1338, 186 N.W. 406, 8 Ia. L. Bull. 49; 4 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
68; 5 Cornell L. Quart. 361. Contra, Lawson v. Lightfoot, (1905) 27
Ken. Law Rep. 217, 84 S.W. 739 (restraint of fee in remainder during
life of life tenant,-valid); Kentland Coal & Coke Co. v. Keen, (1916) 168
Ky. 836, 183 S. W. 247, L.R.A. 1916D 924 (restraint against sale during
life of grantor,--valid) ; and see note 30. But see Ramey v. Ramey, (1922)
195 Ky. 673, 243 S.W. 934 (restraint of fee in remainder during life of
devisee void).

33(1919) 42 Cal. App. 152, 183 Pac. 470; see 4
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34(1845)
35(1881)
36(1891)
37(1917)

5 Ired. Eq. (N.C.) 131.
36 Oh. St. 506, 38 Am. Rep. 602.
141 U.S. 296, 35 L. Ed. 721, 11 S.C.R. 1005.
136 Minn. 126, 161 N.W. 392.
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The recent case of Furst v. Lacher,38 is contrary to the great
weight of authority. 39 A. conveyed land to her son J., on condition that if the land were conveyed or encumbered during the
lifetime of A. or her husband, the conveyance should be void
and the title revert to A. J. became bankrupt and thereafter gave
back a quit claim deed of the land to A. The trustee in bankruptcy brought suit to have this conveyance set aside and the
land subjected to the claims of creditors. Apart from the condition the trustee must have prevailed. And it was argued that
the condition against alienation was void. But the condition was
held valid. The court said:
"Where the intent of the parties is clear their rights and liabilities in respect to the conditions are determined and enforced
as in other contracts. . . . We hold that the provision
created in law a condition subsequent, and if the grantee failed
to comply therewith the title would revert."
The court apparently went on the general principles governing conditions and failed to notice that conditions against aliena40
tion are opposed to public policy and are void. Hause v. O'Leary
was not cited.
Although the preponderance of authority is opposed to restraints and conditions against alienation limited in respect to
time the principles underlying the decisions are not so dear. The
restraint may be merely whimsical, but it may on the other hand
have a well considered purpose. The alienor may desire to
ensure good neighbors. 41 Or he may wish to prevent the dissipation of the property by the alienee. 4' These interests of the
person creating the condition should be respected so far as they
are not in conflict with public policy. In In re Rosher4 3 the court
in discussing the cases upholding conditions restricted as to persons and time said:
"It seems to me that, unintentionally and unwittingly, another
principle has been applied here (forgetting entirely that the question whether a condition was good or bad should be determined
by its repugnancy to the prior gift), and that the question of
policy has been allowed to intervene omitting altogether all
questions of repugnancy."
38(1921) 149 Minn. 53, 182 N.W. 720.
39
See note 32.
40 (1917) 136 Minn. 126, 161 N.W. 392.
41
See Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, (1915) 136 La. 724, 727,
67 So. 641; Koehler v. Rowland, (1918) 275 Mo. 573, 585, 205 S.W. 217.
42This is usually the object of spendthrift trusts. How anxious grantors are sometimes to prevent alienation by the grantee may be seen illustrated by a curious bit of special legislation in Minn. Laws, 1921, cb. 145.
43(1884) 26 Ch. Div. 801.
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No doubt if repugnancy is the true reason for holding unqualified conditions against alienation of a fee simple void, it
applies with equal force to all restraints of alienation. Any restraint however limited would be repugnant to the normal nature
of a fee simple. But the argument of repugnancy begs the question. Since the estates are made subject to the conditions when
they are created they would not be normal estates with normal
incidents. They would be created minus the incident of alienability. Certainly it is possible for the law to sanction estates
in fee simple without the usual incidental power of alienation.
Repugnancy is a scholastic reason that should have no weight in
the twentieth century. The objection to limited restraints can have
44
no other foundation than public policy.
Does public policy invalidate restraints limited in time? It
might go so far. -But it has stopped short of this point in
other instances. As we shall see 45 it is well settled that conditions against, or conditional limitations over upon, the alienation
of estates for life, or for years, in both real and personal property
are valid. The rule had its origin in the interest of lessors of
such estates, but it has been extended to cases where the person
reserving the condition has parted with all his interest in the
property. A may convey to B for life, remainder to B's heirs,
and insert a condition or a conditional limitation upon B's
estate to take effect on alienation.
The common law allows the absolute power of alienation of
the fee to be suspended by the creation of future interests for
lives in being and twenty-one years. And the Minnesota statutes
allow the power to be suspended for the same cause for two
lives. It is true that suspension of the absolute power of alienation cannot be avoided if future interests to persons unborn or
unascertained are permitted. The interest must be avoided to
avoid the suspension. Whereas express restraints may be avoided
and the limitations upheld. And it may be more important to
allow alienors to give their property to such persons than it is
44 "What is meant by repugnancy? Not logical inconsistency. The
conception of a condition against alienation attached to a legal fee simple
or life estate presents no logical difficulties. If the legislature should declare such conditions valid, the courts would have no trouble in upholding
them. This supposed repugnancy or incongruity is either 'a notion which
savors of metaphysical refinement rather than of anything substantial'
(per Lord Truro, C., in Watkins v. Williams, (1851) 3 MacN. & G. 622,
629) or it means 'against public policy.'" Gray, Restraints, 2nd Ed. see.
257. See also id. 74b-74f. And see Kales, Estates and Future Interests
2nd Ed. sees. 447, 714, 723, 735.
45Post, p. 194.
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to sanction, their attempt to keep it in persons to whom it is given.
Yet it is significant that public policy yields to the restricted use
of this device.
Again in many states under the common law spendthrift
trusts 46 may be created for the lives of the beneficiaries that will

effectively prevent the alienation of either the legal Or equitable
interests during these lives. It has even been held that the beneficiary of the equitable fee simple may thus be restrained from
aliening it during his life. And the Minnesota statutes allow
trusts to be created suspending the power of alienation of the
legal fee simple for two lives and the statutes forbid the alienation of either the legal or the equitable estate for the lives of
the beneficiaries. In Hause v. O'Leary4" the court suggests the
object might have been attained by creating a spendthrift trust.
If these devices accord with the policy of the law, what
objection can be urged against allowing equivalent restraints upon
the legal fee simple? Why compel resort to devious ways to
accomplish what might as well be done directly? Under our
recording system there can be no greater danger of deceiving
purchasers and creditors because the property is not in trust. The
difference seems wholly one of form. Restraints on the legal
estate limited in respect to time should stand or fall with spendthrift trusts.4"
(b) Of Estates for Life or for Years; and herein of Spendthrift Trusts.-Life estates or terms for years, either legal or
equitable, in real or personal property may be made subject to
conditions against alienation or bankruptcy, or subject to a limitation over to another upon either of these events. 49 These conditions were first held valid in leases, which left a reversion in the
lessor.50 The lessor's interest in providing against undesirable or
irresponsible tenants was the reason for their enforcement. 51 But
they are now enforced when the alienor has parted with all his
46

Post, p. 196.
47(1917) 136 Minn. 126, 161 N.W. 392.
48
"It may be noted in passing that a state of the law which declares a
restraint on the alienation of a legal estate in fee, or absolute interests in
personalty, void on grounds of public policy, and yet permits the same
restraint when an absolute and indefeasible interest is equitable, challenges
inquiry." Kales, Estates and Future Interests, 2nd Ed., 729; 5 Ili. L. Rev.
318. 49See Emerson v. Marks, (1886) 24 Ill. App. 642, and see note 60.
Gray, Restraints, 2nd Ed. secs. 78-103.
5OLocker v. Savage, (1733) 2 Strange 947.
51
Roe v. Galliers, (1787) 2 Durn. & East 133.
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interest in the property 2 and the restraint is wholly for the benefit
of others than the alienor.5 3
In Barnes v. Gunter, 4 B. devised land to his son W. for
life, on his death to W's children and continued:
"As I intend this bequest as a provision for the support of
my son and his family I direct that the life interest shall not
be subject to be sold by him, and that upon any sale of it . . .
the said bequest of the remainder to his children shall immediately
take effect as in case of his death."
W. sold the land seven years after his father's death. It
was held that the life estate came to an end upon the conveyance
by the life tenant, and the children then became entitled to the
possession.
By the earlier laws mere restraints on life estates or terms
for years which did not make the interests defeasible on alienation or bankruptcy were void both at law and in equity, 55 except
restraints on estates for the separate use of women during coverture and by charitable trusts."
Life estates could be limited
so as to come to an end on alienation or bankruptcy, but they
could not be limited so as to continue free from the effects of
these events. "No man should have an estate to live on and
not an estate to pay his debts with." 7 How the line was drawn
will be seen by a comparison of two cases from the same juris-

diction.
52
This statement is perhaps subject to one exception, in Minnesota.
It has been held that a condition (against operating a saloon) inserted in
the assignment of a term can not be enforced because the assignor has
parted with all his interest. Cameron Tobin Baking Co. v. Tobin, (1908)
104 Minn. 333, 116 N.W. 838. This reasoning is applicable to a condition
against alienation. But the decision is difficult to support (See 3 MINNEsoTh LAw REVIEw 334 note 62; Tiffany, Real Prop. 2nd Ed. 269) as a
general rule governing conditions. It might well have been the rule for
conditions
against alienation but it is not. See note 53.
5
3It was this step that made spendthrift trusts almost inevitable. Cf.
Lord v. Bunn. (1843) 2 Young & C.C.C. 98 and Younghusband v. Gisborne, (1844) 1 Coll. C. C. 400, 15 L. J. Ch. 355, post p. 196. To the extent
that conditions against alienation protect interests of the alienor, either a
reversion in the same property or an interest in other property as in the
saloon case (note 52) there is sound reason for upholding them. But when
the law sustained conditions and conditional limitations inserted to save
the property from dissipation by the alienee, by which the property was
taken from him on alienation or bankruptcy, it was a short step indeed to
sanction a mere restraint by which it would be kept in him inalienable and
free from claims of creditors. See Nichols v. Eaton, (1875), 91 U. S.
716, 23 L. Ed. 254. The error, if error there be, was in the first step rather
than in the second. See Preface to second edition, Gray, Restraints.
54(1910) 111 Minn. 383, 127 N.W. 398.
55
Gray, Restraints, 2nd Ed. sec. 134 et seq.
556Notes 21, 22.
7Tillinghast v. Bradford, (1858) 5 R.I. 205.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
58
In Lord v. BunnI
property was settled on trust to permit T.
to receive the rents for his life but in case he should make any
conveyance of his estate for the benefit of his creditors, or be
discharged under any insolvent act, then the trustees should be
possessed during his life to apply the income for support of him,
his wife, and children, or any of them, for his, her, or thieir
support in such manner as the trustees think proper. T. was
discharged under the act for the relief of insolvent debtors. It
was held that on this event his sole interest ceased and became
an interest in himself, his wife and children to be enjoyed according to the discretion of the trustees. They had a power to appoint
to any of them. The assignee took only such defeasible interest
as the insolvent had. What the trustees appointed to him they
must pay over to his assignee.
In Younghusband v. Gi,-borne"9 there was a devise to trustees
to raise an annuity of 400 pounds for J. for life, the annuity
to be held by the trustees for the personal support, clothing,
etc., of J., so as not to be liable to the claims of creditors; to
be paid to himself until any other person claim it, and then to
be applied for his personal support and for no other purpose. It
was held that J.'s assignee in insolvency was entitled to it. The
court pointed out that there was no clause of forfeiture or
limitation over and added that it was merely a wordy trust for
the benefit of the insolvent with a vain attempt to guard it
from alienation.
These cases still represent in a general way the universal
rule as to legal estates for life.60 They are also still the rule
as to equitable estates in some jurisdictions. But in the majority
of states a different rule prevails in equity.61 In these states
clauses prohibiting the beneficiary of a trust assigning his life
interest, and providing that these interests shall not be subject
to the debts of the beneficiary are valid. In Massachusetts and
Illinois clauses restraining alienation of the fee simple during
62
the life of a beneficiary are valid.

58(1843) 2 Younge & Coll. Ch. Cas. 98.
59(1844) 1 Coll. 400, 15 L.J. Ch. 355.
6
oConditions and conditional limitations against alienation of legal life
estates are valid, but mere restraints are void. The only case (Gray, Restraints, 2nd Ed., secs. 135, 138; Kales, Estates and Future Interests, 2nd
Ed. sec. 730) upholding a mere restraint on a legal life estate (Christy v.
Pulliam, (1855) 17 Il1. 59) is now overruled. Randolph v. Wilkinson,
(1920)
294 II1. 508, 128 N.E. 525.
61
Earlier decisions of the several states are cited Gray, Restraints, 2nd
Ed. sec.
177a et seq.; later cases in Bogert, Trusts, sec. 51.
62
Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Collier, (1916) 222 Mass. 390,
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The period during which these restraints may be validly
imposed is not yet determined. The restraints upheld have not
exceeded the period allowed by the common law rule against
perpetuities. 3 In the analogous case of restraints on the estates
of married women it was held6 4 in England with some hesitation
that a restraint was invalid which might continue for a longer
period than the absolute power of alienation of the fee could be
suspended by the creation of future interests,--lives in being and
twenty-one years. The leading text writers suggest that the
same rule will be applied to these spendthrift trusts in common

law jurisdictions.65
The validity of common law spendthrift trusts has not been
decided in Minnesota. A dictum in Hause v. O'Learv66 favors
Ill N.E. 163; Haskell v. Haskell, (1920) 234 Mass. 442, 125 N.E. 601;
Wagner v. Wagner, (1910) 244 I1. 101, 91 N.E. 66, 5 Ill. Law Rev. 318;
Wallace v. Foxwell, 250 Ill.
616, 95 N.E. 985; Hopkinson v. Swain, (1918)
284 Ill. 11, 3 MINNESOTA LAw REVIEW 67; Gray, Restraints, 2nd Ed. secs.
105, 106, 113 et seq.; Kales, Estates & Future Interests, 2nd Ed. sec. 740.
63
See Boston Safe Deposit Co. v. Collier, (1916) 222 Mass. 390, 111
N.E. 163.
64
1n re Ridley, (1879) L.R. 11 Ch. Div. 645. A trust for M. for life,
on her death in trust for all her children living at her death, and the issue
then living of children who should have died in her lifetime per stirpes,
provided that the legacies to females shall be for their sole use, free from
the debts or control of their respective husbands, and not to be anticipated, sold or encumbered. M. died leaving two daughters born in testator's lifetime, who had attained twenty-one and married. On petition
that the fund be paid out to them it was so ordered, on the ground that the
restraint by its terms extended to persons unborn at testator's death, and
so might continue more than twenty-one years after the termination of
lives in being at that time. It should be noted that the gift was held
good, that only the restraint was avoided, and that the restraint was avoided
as to daughters born at testator's death because by its terms it applied
to those who might have been born afterwards. The last point seems
wrong. In a gift to a class, some of whom may not be ascertained within
the period allowed the gift is void as to all. The gift must be avoided in
order to avoid the suspension, and it would be unjust to give the whole
sum to a part of the class for whom it was intended. But in this case the
gift is good. And it does no injustice to apply the restraint separately to
the shares of those who were in being at testator's death. The period of
the rule against perpetuities may be taken as the limit for the continuance
of these restraints, but it is quite' unnecessary to adopt the manner of
applying the rule. The rule was devised to restrict future estates, and
can only be applied to direct restraints on vested interests by analogy.
See note 65.
-Gray, Perpetuities. 3rd Ed. sec. 121c-121i; Gray, Restraints, 2nd Ed.
secs. 272b-272c; Kales, Estates & Future Interests, 2nd Ed. sec. 737 et seq.
36(1917) 136 Minn. 126, 161 N.W. 392. "Several of the cases cited,
notably Kessner v. Phillips, (1905) 189 Mo. 515, 88 S.W. 66, 107 A.S.R.
368, 3 Ann. Cas. 1005, call attention to the distinction between a grant of
the fee coupled with an attempt to limit the power of alienation, and a
so-called 'spendthrift trust'; and, while recognizing spendthrift trusts as
valid, reject as void any restriction upon the power of alienation attached
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their validity. The dictum may refer to the trust authorized by
statute to receive the rents and profits of land, and apply them
to the use of any person.67 It is not necessary to put restraining
clauses into a trust of this kind. No persons beneficially interested in this trust can assign or in any manner dispose of such
interest." The property that may be protected from voluntary
alienation by a common law spendthrift trust or by this statutory
trust is not restricted in amount. Neither under the common law
trust is there any restriction on the amount that may be made
unavailable to creditors of the beneficiary. There is such a restriction on this statutory trust. The surplus of the rent and
profits, beyond the sum necessary for the education and support
of the person for whose benefit the trust is created, is subject
in equity to the claims of his creditors. 9 The statutory restraint
on alienation of the whole amount and the statutory liability of
the excess to creditors apply in terms only to one of the several
classes of trusts that may be created. It is probably impossible for the creator of such a trust expressly to make larger
sums unavailable to creditors in view of this statutory declaration
of liability. But several other classes of trusts are authorized.70
As to them there are no statutory provisions against alienation
or liability to creditors. 7 1 Is the statutory spendthrift trust exclusive of its kind? Or will trusts of the other classes, e.g., of
personal property without any restraining clauses be assimilated
to trusts of this class and be governed by the same restrictions ?72
to a grant of the fee either in possession or in remainder. The evidence in
the present case shows that John had not been of normal mentality since
receiving an injury in his boyhood, and that his condition finally became
such that some six years ago he was committed to an insane hospital. It
is likely that the fear that he would fritter away his property prompted
his mother to attempt to restrain him from doing so for a limited time
after he was deprived of the guiding influence of his father. But she

made no attempt to establish a spendthrift trust, and, as a restriction upon
the power of alienation cannot be attached to the grant of a remainder in
fee, we feel constrained to hold that the provision that John should not
a period of five years after his father's death is void."
sell for
67
68

Minn., G.S. 1913 sec. 6710 (3).

Minn., G. S. 1913 sec. 6718.
69
7

Minn., G.S. 1913 sec. 6712.

0Minn., G. S. 1913 sec. 6710.

71
"The rights and interest of every person for whose benefit a trust
for the payment of a sum in gross is created are assignable." Minn., G. S.

1913 72sec. 6718.
New York, Michigan and Wisconsin have statutes identical with
Minnesota G.S. 1913 secs. 6712, 6718. They have no statutes restraining

assignment of beneficial interests in similar trusts of personal property.
In New York trusts to receive the income of personal property and to
apply it to the use of the beneficiaries are assimilated to similar trusts in
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Or can the creator of other trusts effectively provide that the
property shall be inalienable, and unavailable to creditors as in
common law states ?73 There is no authoritative answer to these
questions in this state.

(To be Continued.)
real property, and the beneficial interests are not assignable. Tolles v.
Wood, (1885) 99 N.Y. 616, 1 N.E. 251; Cochrane v. Schell, (1894) 140
N.Y. 516, 35 N.E. 971. They are assignable in Wisconsin. Williams v.
Smith, (1903) 117 Wis. 142, 93 N.W. 464; Mangan v. Shea, (1914) 158
Wis. 619, 149 N.W. 378. No Michigan decision on the point has been
found, but the statutes apply only to trusts of real property in other respects.
Penny v. Croul, (1889) 76 Mich. 471.:
73
1n Estate of Samuel Thorne, (1920) 145 Minn. 412, 417, 177 N.W.
638, it is said:
"The origin of trusts was no doubt for the protection of the beneficiary so as to assure to him the income from the corpus of the trust and
closing every avenue by which he, or others, might acquire, dispose of,
impair or encumber the property itself. And the courts when dealing with
trusts have, of course, adopted and applied principles of law which, as
between the beneficiary, his creditors and his trustees, conserve the trust
estate and attain the purposes of the trust." If this dictum means
that the beneficiary of a trust who is unrestrained by statute or express
provision in the trust instrument cannot alienate his interest, or make it
liable for his debts, it is unsupported by authority. "As soon as such
trusts appeared equity hastened to give a remedy; and the remedy was
simply to apply the venerable principle of law and equity alike,--that
property shall be alienable and liable for debts." Gray, Restraints on
Alienation, 2nd Ed., sec. 256. "In the absence of provisions in the trust
instrument or statutes to the contrary the cestui que trust may alienate his
interest as freely as he might a legal estate or interest." Bogert, Trusts 433
with citations. "The law is perfectly settled that the estate of a cestui
que trust may be conveyed as well as any other." Elliott v. Armstrong,
(1829) 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 198, 208.

